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THE APPRENDI‐BLAKELY CASES: SENTENCING REFORM COUNTER REVOLUTION?
Author(s) -
FRASE RICHARD S.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
criminology and public policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.6
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1745-9133
pISSN - 1538-6473
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00445.x
Subject(s) - sentencing guidelines , supreme court , legislature , political science , commission , jury , reform act , jurisdiction , sentence , law , scope (computer science) , reasonable doubt , law and economics , economics , computer science , artificial intelligence , programming language
Recent Supreme Court decisions have extended jury trial rights and beyond‐reasonable‐doubt proof standards to certain sentence‐enhancement facts. The first two cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona , were narrow in scope and relatively uncontroversial. But Blakely v. Washington marked a substantial expansion of the rationale and scope of Apprendi , and threatened to invalidate entire sentencing reform systems, both legally‐binding guidelines of the type at issue in Blakely and it's sequel, Booker v. United States , and statutory determinate sentence systems like the one invalidated in Cunningham v. California . Each of these decisions has potential effects not only on sentencing severity and disparity in the cases controlled by that decision, but also on prosecutorial, legislative, and sentencing commission measures designed to comply with the decision, avoid it, and/or mitigate its impact. Field resistance and avoidance measures are likely to be stronger in jurisdictions where the existing sentencing system enjoyed broad support; in such jurisdictions, resistance may be particularly strong to the more controversial Blakely ruling. Impact assessments must therefore carefully distinguish the separate impacts of Apprendi and Blakely in each jurisdiction being studied, and the extent of support for the existing sentencing system. Such assessments should also examine pre‐existing trends and other independent sources of change; leadership by sentencing commissions or other officials in crafting responsive measures; structural and other features of the sentencing system which render compliance more or less difficult; and second‐stage effects, on sentencing, prosecutorial, or sentencing policy decisions, that reflect the prior compliance, avoidance, and mitigation measures adopted in that jurisdiction. The greatest long‐term effects may be on prosecutorial, legislative, and commission decisions, rather than on sentencing outcomes.

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