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MANAGING RETALIATION: DRUG ROBBERY AND INFORMAL SANCTION THREATS *
Author(s) -
JACOBS BRUCE A.,
TOPALLI VOLKAN,
WRIGHT RICHARD
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
criminology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.467
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1745-9125
pISSN - 0011-1384
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-9125.2000.tb00887.x
Subject(s) - criminology , deterrence (psychology) , deterrence theory , psychology , social psychology , law and economics , political science , sociology , law
The notion that informal sanction threats influence criminal decision‐making is perhaps the most important contribution to neoclassical theory in the past 15 years. Notably absent from this contribution is an examination of the ways in which the risk of victim retaliation—arguably, the ultimate informal sanction—mediates the process. The present article addresses this gap, examining how active drug robbers (individuals who take money and drugs from dealers by force or threat of force) perceive and respond to the risk of victim retaliation in real‐life settings and circumstances. The data's theoretical implications for deterrence and violence contagions are explored. Data were drawn from in‐depth interviews with 25 currently active drug robbers recruited from the streets of St. Louis, Missouri.