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SELF‐INTEREST, EQUITY, AND CRIME CONTROL: A GAME‐THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING
Author(s) -
MESQUITA BRUCE BUENO,
COHEN LAWRENCE E.
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
criminology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.467
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1745-9125
pISSN - 0011-1384
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-9125.1995.tb01187.x
Subject(s) - entitlement (fair division) , equity (law) , deterrence (psychology) , punishment (psychology) , economics , incentive , payment , rational choice theory (criminology) , deterrence theory , public economics , welfare , crime control , law and economics , microeconomics , positive economics , criminology , criminal justice , sociology , social psychology , political science , psychology , law , market economy , finance
Employing the analytic technique of game theory, we attempt to answer questions about how individuals with different proclivities to use crime to accomplish ends, and different beliefs about society's fairness, are likely to respond to different incentives and disincentives that are derived from strain and neoclassical deterrence theories. Our analysis indicates that the crime control policies typically recommended by adherents of both theories are often logically invalid, given the premises upon which they are supposedly based. For example, our analysis suggests why punishment strategies like “three strikes and you're out” and “entitlement strategies” such as welfare and other short‐term redistributive payment programs fail to deter crime. Finally, after including notions of equity with traditional rational choice assumptions, our analysis identifies a mix of theoretically derived strategies that may more effectively deter crime.