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TRANSFERABLE STOCK OPTIONS (TSOS) AND THE COMING REVOLUTION IN EQUITY‐BASED PAY
Author(s) -
Hall Brian J.
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
journal of applied corporate finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1745-6622
pISSN - 1078-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2004.tb00591.x
Subject(s) - non qualified stock option , equity (law) , stock (firearms) , incentive , shares outstanding , restricted stock , economics , business , stock dilution , finance , database transaction , microeconomics , shareholder , stock market , computer science , corporate governance , mechanical engineering , paleontology , programming language , horse , political science , law , biology , engineering
The dominant form of equity pay in the U.S. will change dramatically when accounting rules are changed (most likely in 2005) to require companies to charge the cost of their stock option plans on their income statements. Many companies are already switching from stock options to other forms of equity pay, especially restricted stock. The most notable switcher was Microsoft, the world's largest user of stock option pay. In July 2003, partnering with J.P. Morgan, Microsoft created a onetime transferable stock option (TSO) program that allowed holders of underwater Microsoft options to sell their options to J.P. Morgan in return for restricted shares. But the most important consequence of this transaction may not be a widespread shift by corporate America to restricted shares, but rather the creation of a more costeffective kind of stock option. By clearing the potentially messy hurdles involving taxes, accounting, SEC rules, and “transaction mechanics,” Microsoft has opened the door for TSOs to be considered as an ongoing equitypay instrument, perhaps replacing standard stock options (which are not transferable). TSOs share the key advantages of restricted stock in terms of providing robust retention and ownership incentives and higher valuecost efficiency, while maintaining the key “leverage” advantage of options. In so doing, they create significant upside (and downside) while largely avoiding the “pay for pulse” problem of restricted stock. They also introduce the discipline of competitive pricing by third‐party bidders. The bid prices of investment banks create nearly all of the information required for accurate estimates of option cost, which should foster greater board accountability and improved corporate governance.