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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EVA, AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Author(s) -
Stern Joel
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
journal of applied corporate finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1745-6622
pISSN - 1078-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2004.tb00541.x
Subject(s) - economic value added , corporate governance , corporation , incentive , shareholder value , stern , shareholder , accounting , economics , business , profit maximization , finance , profit (economics) , market economy , microeconomics , marine engineering , engineering
Together with corporate governance expert Stuart Gillan, the managing partner of Stern Stewart discusses important issues of corporate financial management, including the fundamental objective of the public corporation and how boards of directors can achieve it. Whereas financial economists have long argued that the corporate goal is the maximization of firm value, Stern advocates a variation of the concept known as “Market Value Added”–one that is designed to discourage corporate growth and capital raising that does not end up adding value for shareholders. To accomplish this goal, he emphasizes the importance of incentive compensation systems tied not to accounting earnings, but to a measure of economic profit like EVA. And, as Stern argues in closing, EVA‐based incentive systems are likely to be effective not only in the private sector, but in increasing the efficiency and value of state‐owned enterprises. Indeed, such systems could bring about a new kind of employee capitalism that ESOPs promised, but have largely failed, to deliver.