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COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE U.K. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (WITH A BRIEF LOOK AT CALIFORNIA)
Author(s) -
Littlechild Stephen C.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
journal of applied corporate finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1745-6622
pISSN - 1078-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00424.x
Subject(s) - deregulation , restructuring , competition (biology) , incentive , mains electricity , competitor analysis , electricity retailing , business , electricity , industrial organization , economics , electricity market , market economy , finance , marketing , power (physics) , ecology , physics , quantum mechanics , electrical engineering , biology , engineering
In this article, the U.K.'s Director General of Electricity Supply from 1989 to 1998 assesses the effects of deregulation and competition on the U.K. electricity industry after about a decade. Expansion of existing competitors, new entry, and further restructuring have reduced the aggregate share of the largest two generation companies from nearly 80% to 26%. Efficiency has improved and wholesale prices have fallen after an initial increase. Voluntary bilateral contracts markets are about to replace the mandatory “Pool,” with centralised control limited to physically balancing the system and settling contract imbalances. Retail supply competition has been active for large industrial customers since the beginning, and 80% of them now buy from another supplier. The market for residential customers opened in early 1999, and already nearly a quarter of them have chosen another supplier. Incentive price controls on transmission and distribution have stimulated increased efficiency and significantly reduced use‐of‐system charges. Overall, prices for all classes of customers have fallen by 25–35% in real terms since privatisation, and quality of service has improved. California has adopted a policy that is similar in many respects, but with very different results. The problems there have stemmed partly from less favourable demand and supply conditions, but also from significant policy differences, including barriers to building new capacity, obstacles to the use of long‐term supply (or hedging) contracts, retail price controls at untenable levels, and the requirement that (after a transition period) utilities pass through wholesale spot prices directly to their customers. Changes in such policies will eventually enable both producers and consumers in California to benefit from competition.