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EVIDENCE ON EVA
Author(s) -
Biddle Gary C.,
Bowen Robert M.,
Wallace James S.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of applied corporate finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1745-6622
pISSN - 1078-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-6622.1999.tb00008.x
Subject(s) - passive income , economic value added , residual income valuation , net income , valuation (finance) , incentive , economics , income statement , shareholder , earnings , financial economics , actuarial science , business , microeconomics , accounting , cost of capital , public economics , balance sheet , finance , gross income , corporate governance , tax reform , state income tax
EVA has attracted considerable attention as an alternative to traditional accounting earnings for use in both valuation and incentive compensation. With a host of consultants now marketing related metrics, numerous claims have been made—most based on anecdotal evidence or in‐house studies. This paper summarizes the authors' independent evidence regarding EVA's alleged advantages. The authors begin by reviewing the theory that links the underlying concept of residual income to shareholder value. Second, they discuss how Stern Stewart modifies residual income to produce its proprietary EVA metric and show how median EVA compares with residual income, net income, and operating cash flows over the period 1988–97. Third, they examine the claim that EVA is more closely associated with stock returns and firm value than is net income. Their evidence indicates that EVA does not dominate net income in associations with stock returns and firm values. Fourth, they examine a second claim that compensation plans based on residual income motivate managers to take actions consistent with increasing shareholder value. Here the evidence (from a study by Wallace) suggests that managers do respond to residual income‐based incentives by, for example, increasing asset sales, cutting capital expenditures, repurchasing stock, and producing higher levels of residual income. The authors conclude by arguing that a metric such as EVA can be effective for internal incentive purposes even if it conveys little news to market participants regarding the firm's valuation.