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RAROC AT BANK OF AMERICA: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Author(s) -
Zaik Edward,
Walter John,
Retting Gabriela,
James Christopher
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
journal of applied corporate finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1745-6622
pISSN - 1078-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1745-6622.1996.tb00117.x
Subject(s) - risk adjusted return on capital , capital adequacy ratio , economic capital , capital requirement , return on capital , cost of capital , basel ii , business , physical capital , economics , capital budgeting , finance , financial capital , actuarial science , incentive , microeconomics , profit (economics) , capital formation , human capital , economic growth , project appraisal
In 1993, Bank of America's Risk and Capital Analysis Group was charged with the task of developing and instituting a single corporate‐wide system to allocate capital to all the bank's activities. Since 1994, that system has been providing quarterly reports of risk‐adjusted returns on capital (RAROC) for each of the bank's 37 major business units. By 1995, B of A had also developed the capability to calculate RAROC down to the level of individual products, transactions, and customer relationships. RAROC systems allocate capital for two basic reasons: (1) risk management and (2) performance evaluation. For risk management purposes, the overriding goal of allocating capital to individual business units is to determine the bank's optimal capital structure–the proportion of equity to assets that minimizes the bank's overall cost of funding. This process involves estimating how much the risk (or volatility) of each business unit contributes to the total risk of the bank, and hence to the bank's overall capital requirements. For performance evaluation purposes, RAROC systems assign capital to business units as part of a process of determining the risk‐adjusted rate of return and, ultimately, the “economic profit” of each business unit. The objective in this case is to measure a business unit's contribution to shareholder value, and thus to provide a basis for effective planning, capital budgeting, and incentive compensation at the business unit level. Concerns about capital adequacy, along with the Basel risk‐based capital requirements, have played some role in the growth of RAROC among commercial banks. But the most powerful impetus to bankers' use of more systematic risk measures is coming from increasingly activist institutional investors. Besides giving senior management an economic basis for evaluating the bank as a portfolio of businesses and for making resource allocation decisions that improve the bank's risk/reward profile, RAROC systems are also expected to produce better performance by holding managers accountable for the amount of investor capital they are putting at risk.