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On Exporting by Import State Traders and Peculiar Effects of Negotiated Minimum Access Commitments
Author(s) -
Larue Bruno,
Fulton Murray,
Veeman Michele
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
canadian journal of agricultural economics/revue canadienne d'agroeconomie
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.505
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1744-7976
pISSN - 0008-3976
DOI - 10.1111/j.1744-7976.1999.tb00433.x
Subject(s) - tariff , economics , rules of origin , international economics , free trade , welfare , profit (economics) , international trade , liberalization , business , microeconomics , market economy
It has been alleged that exportation by import state trading enterprises (ISTEs) must involve unfair trade practices. We show that such exporting may result from a rational use of market power by a sufficiently protected price discriminating ISTE. We argue that the flawed design and implementation of the tarffication process initiated in the last GATT agreement is providing ISTEs with incentives to export. The tariffication of import quotas and other related import restrictions was dirty in the sense that it permitted the setting of prohibitively high tariffs on many commodities. More importantly, it failed to eliminate quantitative trade barriers as the previous import quotas were replaced by minimum access commitments (MACs). In this paper, we use a simple partial equilibrium framework to explore the trade and welfare consequences of trade liberalization through tariff reductions and MAC enlargements under the small country assumption when domestic production and imports are controlled by an ISTE. We show that tariff reductions and MAC enlargements have very different effects on the behavior of the ISTE. MAC enlargements induce inefficient trade by encouraging the profit maximizing ISTE to increase its exports. In terms of welfare, MAC enlargements are immiser‐izing. We conclude that tariff reductions are to be preferred to MAC increases as a means to liberalize trade .