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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BARGAINING FOR ADOPTION ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS
Author(s) -
Mary Eschelbach Hansen,
Daniel Pollack
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
family court review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.171
H-Index - 4
eISSN - 1744-1617
pISSN - 1531-2445
DOI - 10.1111/j.1744-1617.2005.00049.x
Subject(s) - payment , disadvantage , welfare , raising (metalworking) , business , public economics , labour economics , economics , unintended consequences , outcome (game theory) , actuarial science , microeconomics , finance , political science , market economy , law , geometry , mathematics
Families that adopt children who are in foster care may receive monthly adoption assistance payments to offset the cost of raising the adopted child. The amount of the adoption assistance payment is the subject of bargaining between the family and the child welfare authority. This article uses a bargaining model to highlight factors that, in addition to the expected costs of raising the child, might influence the outcome of bargaining over adoption assistance payments. Findings indicate that married parents who adopt children already in their care have an advantage in bargaining, and single women who adopt their kin or foster children have a disadvantage in bargaining.