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Market selection with endogenous information revelation
Author(s) -
Condie Scott,
Yoo Seung Han
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00159.x
Subject(s) - revelation , economics , mathematical economics , selection (genetic algorithm) , microeconomics , adverse selection , general equilibrium theory , process (computing) , information asymmetry , negative information , computer science , philosophy , psychology , artificial intelligence , theology , cognitive psychology , operating system
This paper uses the dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Mailath and Sandroni (2003) but allows information revelation to be determined endogenously. The paper establishes sufficient conditions on the exogenous information arrival process that ensure that an investor who receives unique information infinitely often drives out an investor who receives unique information only finitely often.