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When is an antitrust authority not aggressive enough in fighting cartels?
Author(s) -
Harrington, Jr Joseph E.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00148.x
Subject(s) - cartel , enforcement , economics , collusion , law and economics , competition policy , business , law , microeconomics , political science , monopoly
If an antitrust authority chooses an enforcement policy to maximize the number of successfully prosecuted cartels, when does that policy minimize the number of cartels that form? When the detection and prosecution of cartels is inherently difficult, it is found that an antitrust authority’s policy minimizes the number of cartels, as is socially desirable. However, when the detection and prosecution of cartels is not too difficult, an antitrust authority is not aggressive enough in that it prosecutes too few cartel cases.