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Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasi‐extreme social welfare functions
Author(s) -
Campbell Donald E.,
Kelly Jerry S.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00139.x
Subject(s) - bounded function , scope (computer science) , transitive relation , domain (mathematical analysis) , set (abstract data type) , mathematics , function (biology) , welfare , uniform boundedness , power (physics) , mathematical economics , economics , finite set , social welfare , bounded variation , combinatorics , discrete mathematics , computer science , mathematical analysis , physics , political science , market economy , quantum mechanics , evolutionary biology , biology , programming language , law
The set of alternatives is infinite. If the social welfare function is transitive‐valued and minimal sufficient sets are uniformly bounded, then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of the feasible set, and a rich sub‐domain of profiles, within which a reduction in the scope of someone's dictatorial power must be accompanied by an equal increase in the fraction of the pairs that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences.