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Nonlinear taxation and punishment
Author(s) -
Andersson Tommy
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00046.x
Subject(s) - economics , welfare , punishment (psychology) , microeconomics , nonlinear system , pareto principle , social welfare function , set (abstract data type) , function (biology) , mathematical economics , selection (genetic algorithm) , nonlinear pricing , computer science , psychology , operations management , social psychology , physics , quantum mechanics , evolutionary biology , artificial intelligence , market economy , biology , programming language
The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n ≥ 3 differing individuals. It is demonstrated that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self‐selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight.