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Circumventing Adversity: Executive Orders and Divided Government
Author(s) -
FINE JEFFREY A.,
WARBER ADAM L.
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.03965.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , presidency , government (linguistics) , executive order , political science , executive summary , divided government , executive branch , test (biology) , public administration , executive power , empirical research , politics , law , economics , epistemology , paleontology , philosophy , linguistics , finance , biology
Scholars of the unilateral presidency are left with an empirical puzzle regarding whether and how divided government influences presidential use of executive orders. While the strategic model suggests that presidents should issue more executive orders when faced with an adverse situation vis‐à‐vis Congress, most of the research finds just the opposite. We offer a more appropriate test of the strategic model by examining how presidential‐congressional adversity influences presidential decisions to issue symbolic, routine, and major policy executive orders. We find support for the strategic model and present new findings to demonstrate that presidents behave differently with respect to distinct types of executive orders during periods of unified and divided government.