Premium
The Presidential Pork Barrel and the Conditioning Effect of Term
Author(s) -
TAYLOR ANDREW J.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2007.02630.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , procurement , counterintuitive , per capita , extant taxon , term (time) , generalizability theory , economics , state (computer science) , test (biology) , political science , public economics , political economy , politics , law , sociology , statistics , demography , management , philosophy , algorithm , epistemology , quantum mechanics , evolutionary biology , physics , population , computer science , biology , paleontology , mathematics
I examine across‐state distributions of procurement contracts from 1984 to 2004 to test two hypotheses that a presidential electoral connection explains geographic patterns in federal spending. Both hypotheses are derived from a basic vote‐buying theory and are assumed to be conditioned by the president's term. The first hypothesis is that, during first terms, the president will direct a disproportionate amount of procurement dollars per capita to battleground states. The second is that, during first terms, states that gave winning presidential candidates a disproportionately large share of their popular vote will benefit this way. I reject both and, therefore, challenge the generalizability of important extant work. Instead, I find that states that gave presidents disproportionately fewer of their popular votes in the reelection receive more procurement dollars per capita—that is, there is a counterintuitive second‐term effect.