Premium
Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power
Author(s) -
CORLEY PAMELA C.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.02573.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , power (physics) , political science , advice (programming) , public relations , law , politics , computer science , physics , quantum mechanics , programming language
This research note attempts to determine under what conditions presidents will use the unilateral tool of recess appointments, specifically to independent agencies. Multivariate analysis reveals that, after controlling for the effects of other variables, presidents are more likely to make a recess appointment if they lack partisan support in the Senate and when they have high public approval. Recess appointments are not cost free and, consequently, presidents use this power strategically and sparingly.