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Migration Decisions Within Dual‐Earner Partnerships: A Test of Bargaining Theory
Author(s) -
Abraham Martin,
Auspurg Katrin,
Hinz Thomas
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
journal of marriage and family
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.578
H-Index - 159
eISSN - 1741-3737
pISSN - 0022-2445
DOI - 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2010.00736.x
Subject(s) - bargaining power , dual (grammatical number) , test (biology) , incentive , homogeneous , power (physics) , economics , labour economics , demographic economics , social psychology , microeconomics , psychology , art , paleontology , physics , literature , quantum mechanics , biology , thermodynamics
This article focuses on the problems faced by dual‐earner partnerships arising from the regional coordination of the partners' careers. It is still unknown whether the fact that couples are less mobile than singles is caused by homogeneous preferences within couples or by a process of balancing conflicting interests. Consequently, we analyze the potential conflicts provoked by work‐related migration incentives. We test hypotheses derived from bargaining theory using quasi‐experimental data from a factorial survey of nearly 280 European couples. Our results support the bargaining approach and confirm that asymmetrical shifts in bargaining power drive the potential for conflict. Women's willingness to move is generally less than men's, but the impact of employment prospects differs only slightly by gender.