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What the Problem with Russell Isn't
Author(s) -
Oppy Graham
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
new blackfriars
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1741-2005
pISSN - 0028-4289
DOI - 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2009.01299.x
Subject(s) - philosophy , epistemology , attribution , reading (process) , psychology , social psychology , linguistics
Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well‐known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well‐justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection.