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Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court
Author(s) -
Garoupa Nuno,
Gili Marian,
GómezPomar Fernando
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
journal of empirical legal studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.529
H-Index - 24
eISSN - 1740-1461
pISSN - 1740-1453
DOI - 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2012.01270.x
Subject(s) - dissent , supreme court , politics , political science , law , empirical research , mythology , majority opinion , law and economics , economics , philosophy , theology , epistemology
This article develops an empirical analysis of judicial behavior in the S panish S upreme C ourt, a court of law dominated by career judiciary. We focus on administrative review. The evidence seems to confirm that a career judiciary is not strongly politically aligned and favors consensus, formalism, and dissent avoidance. Notwithstanding, we detect a significant relationship between the decisions of the C ourt and the interest of the government. We suggest that our empirical analysis makes a significant contribution to undermine the myth of political insulation by career judges. Unlike previous literature, however, we argue and illustrate that judicial politicization can be consistent with consensus and dissent avoidance.