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Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Situations in the European Union: What Difference Does It Make?
Author(s) -
Da ConceiçãoHeldt Eugénia
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
negotiation journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.238
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1571-9979
pISSN - 0748-4526
DOI - 10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00092.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , unanimity , distributive property , european union , economics , distributive justice , field (mathematics) , microeconomics , political science , law and economics , international trade , economic justice , law , mathematics , pure mathematics
Despite the distinction made between integrative and distributive bargaining situations in European studies literature, few studies have focused specifically on how these two situations differ. This article attempts to close this gap by examining two key bargaining situations involving fisheries that led to the Europeanization of this policy field. The integrative bargaining situation dealt with the negotiations about the structural policy and common organization of the market for fish products. In contrast, the distributive bargaining case focused on the protracted negotiations over resource conservation and management policies. The article focuses primarily on how the unanimity decision rule may affect negotiation patterns in the European Union and on how the specific type of bargaining situation affects policy outcomes. The thesis is that different bargaining tools are used to reach an agreement.