Premium
Does Interest‐Based Bargaining (IBB) Really Make a Difference in Collective Bargaining Outcomes?
Author(s) -
Paquet Renaud,
Gaétan Isabelle,
Bergeron JeanGuy
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
negotiation journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.238
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1571-9979
pISSN - 0748-4526
DOI - 10.1111/j.1571-9979.2000.tb00219.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , collective bargaining , corporate governance , law and economics , bargaining power , business , political science , economics , market economy , microeconomics , law , management
This study seeks to identify what specific kinds of compromises result from IBB, or interest‐based bargaining, and what differentiates agreements that are reached using this method from the ones that are negotiated through more traditional forms of collective bargaining. The authors compare the changes to collective agreements in 19 cases that used interest‐based bargaining and the changes to agreements in 19 cases that used more traditional forms of negotiation. Their analysis reveals that clauses dealing with joint governance and organizational innovation underwent more changes when the parties adopted the IBB approach. In addition, IBB has given rise to more union concessions.