Premium
The Strategic Use of Interests, Rights, and Power to Resolve Disputes
Author(s) -
Lytle Anne L.,
Brett Jeanne M.,
Shapiro Debra L.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
negotiation journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.238
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1571-9979
pISSN - 0748-4526
DOI - 10.1111/j.1571-9979.1999.tb00178.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , law and economics , power (physics) , distributive property , political science , dispute resolution , conflict resolution , philosophy of law , business , public relations , law , economics , social psychology , psychology , physics , public law , quantum mechanics , mathematics , pure mathematics
To ensure success in resolving difficult disputes, negotiators must make strategic decisions about their negotiation approach. In this essay, we make practical recommendations for negotiation strategy based on Ury, Brett, and Goldberg's (1993) interests, rights, and power framework for dispute resolution and subsequent empirical research by Brett, Shapiro, and Lytle (1998). We discuss how negotiations cycle through interests, rights, and power foci; the prevalence of reciprocity; and the one‐sided, distributive outcomes that result from reciprocity of rights and power communications. We then turn to using interests, rights, and power strategically in negotiations. We discuss choosing an opening strategy, breaking conflict spirals of reciprocated rights and power communications, and when and how to use rights and power communications effectively in negotiations.