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Encouraging Cooperation: Revisiting Solidarity and Commitment Effects in Prisoner's Dilemma Games 1
Author(s) -
Mulford Matthew,
Jackson Jonathan,
Svedsäter Henrik
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008.00421.x
Subject(s) - solidarity , dilemma , prisoner's dilemma , social psychology , psychology , social dilemma , group (periodic table) , work (physics) , epistemology , political science , law , chemistry , politics , philosophy , engineering , organic chemistry , mechanical engineering
Pre‐play discussion consistently increases cooperation in dilemma interactions. Most explanations of this “cheap‐talk” effect are based on either commitment or group solidarity effects. Because discussion about the upcoming dilemma allows participants to make promises and creates group solidarity, the 2 explanations are often confounded. This paper aims to clarify past results by having participants engage in an unrelated discussion prior to a dilemma interaction. We find that solidarity effects can be induced by minimal group categorizations, but are relatively weak. Discussions involving consequential but unrelated coordination tasks are shown to prime cooperative norms and increase cooperation with both in‐group and out‐group members. Our findings suggest that cheap talk may work for even cheaper reasons than previously thought.