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Raising the Price of Agreement: Public Commitment and the Lowball Compliance Procedure 1
Author(s) -
Burger Jerry M.,
Cornelius Tara
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01931.x
Subject(s) - compliance (psychology) , statement (logic) , psychology , raising (metalworking) , social psychology , nothing , control (management) , economics , law , political science , philosophy , management , epistemology , geometry , mathematics
Three studies examined the effect on compliance when a requester raises the price of the request. Participants in Experiment 1 were told that they would receive a free coffee mug for donating money to a fundraiser but were interrupted before they could respond and were told that the fundraisers were out of mugs. These participants were less likely to donate money than a group told nothing about the mugs. Experiments 2 and 3 compared this interruption procedure with the lowball procedure, which also uses a small‐to‐large price progression. The results from these two studies indicate that allowing people to respond to the initial price is critical for producing the lowball effect. Without a statement of public commitment, the small‐to‐large price progression led to a decrease rather than an increase in compliance relative to a control group.