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Individual Restraint and Group Efficiency in Commons Dilemmas: The Effects of Two Types of Environmental Uncertainty 1
Author(s) -
Hine Donald W.,
Gifford Robert
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1996.tb01121.x
Subject(s) - commons , dilemma , social dilemma , fishing , resource (disambiguation) , fish <actinopterygii> , group (periodic table) , natural resource economics , psychology , social psychology , environmental economics , environmental resource management , economics , fishery , ecology , computer science , biology , mathematics , chemistry , computer network , geometry , organic chemistry
In most real‐world commons, the exact resource quantity is rarely known, and the rate at which the resource regenerates is not always predictable. Annual salmon runs, for example, are based on breeding rates and many other factors; those fishing never know exactly how many fish will be available for next year's season. The present study employed a computerized commons dilemma simulation to investigate the impact of uncertainty in pool size and regeneration rate on individuals harvest choice and the efficiency with which groups managed the resource pool. Both types of uncertainty produced significant declines in individual restraint and group efficiency, although the group‐level effects tended to be stronger than those at the individual level. Implications for the management of real‐world commons are discussed.