Premium
Oligopoly Bargaining: Effects of Agreement Pressure and Opponent Strategies
Author(s) -
Esser James K.,
Calvillo Michael J.,
Scheel Michael R.,
Walker James L.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1990.tb01471.x
Subject(s) - oligopoly , adversary , microeconomics , psychology , social psychology , economics , business , computer science , cournot competition , computer security
Previous research on oligopoly bargaining has shown soft strategies to be superior to tough strategies and has suggested that this effect may be moderated by agreement pressure. However, previous research is difficult to interpret because the effects of strategy changes and subsequent strategies have not been adequately tested. Female students from introductory psychology classes were assigned the role of buyers and bargained with initially soft or tough and subsequently soft or tough programmed (seller) strategies under low or high agreement pressure. Subjects had the opportunity to bargain with the strategy (seller) of their choice and to change sellers at any time. As hypothesized, soft seller strategies were found to be superior to tough strategies. In addition, the superiority of soft seller strategies was increased by low agreement pressure.