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Variable Credibility Threats: A Procedure for the Enhancement of Deterrence Effectiveness 1
Author(s) -
Friedland Nehemia
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1985.tb00898.x
Subject(s) - credibility , audit , deterrence (psychology) , variable (mathematics) , population , simple (philosophy) , tax evasion , psychology , computer science , econometrics , statistics , mathematics , law , economics , accounting , political science , criminology , public economics , sociology , mathematical analysis , philosophy , demography , epistemology
This experiment evaluated a procedure whereby tax evasions can be more effectively deterred by dividing the taxpayers' population into two, high‐ and low‐audit probability, categories. The procedure employs a rule that assigns tax evaders to the high‐audit probability category and assigns those who abide by the law to a low‐audit probability category. A simple empirical simulation showed that the “variable probabilities” procedure prevented tax evasions more effectively than an alternative, “fixed probability” procedure, in which the same audit probability applied to all individuals, regardless of their past record.