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Cooptation and Coalition Mobilization 1
Author(s) -
Lawler Edward J.,
Youngs George A.,
Lesh Michael D.
Publication year - 1978
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1978.tb00777.x
Subject(s) - reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , volition (linguistics) , situational ethics , promotion (chess) , social psychology , hierarchy , context (archaeology) , action (physics) , psychology , mobilization , political science , politics , law , paleontology , linguistics , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , biology
The question addressed by this research was, “When structural circumstances make revolutionary action likely, under what conditions will a cooptation strategy prevent subordinate revolts?” Experimental procedures established a group status hierarchy consisting of a leader and two subordinates. Groups earned collective outcomes, and the leader usurped an inequitable portion of these outcomes. In this context, the first experiment shows that a cooptation strategy (i.e., offer of a promotion to one of two subordinates) inhibits subordinate revolts. Two additional experiments indicate that the cooptation strategy is most effective (a) if the offer (strategy) provides the target of cooptation a source of personal gain; (b) if theoffer (strategy) is a result of the leader's own volition, rather than situational constraints; and (c) if the leader converys a strong commitment to follow through on the promotion offer. The results are interpreted with reference to subjective‐expected‐utility and reciprocity theories.