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Reactions to Receiving Aid as a Function of Cost to Donor and Opportunity to Aid 1
Author(s) -
Castro Maria Angela C.
Publication year - 1974
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1974.tb02640.x
Subject(s) - receipt , resentment , equity (law) , opportunity cost , function (biology) , third party , actuarial science , business , psychology , microeconomics , economics , internet privacy , computer science , political science , law , politics , accounting , evolutionary biology , biology
Drawing on equity theory, two possibilities that might reduce resentment of the donor following the receipt of aid which cannot be repaid were investigated: (a) the cost to the donor is minimized, and (b) the recipient has an opportunity to aid a third party. The results provide evidence that the recipient will like the donor less and be less willing to request future aid when he cannot repay the aid than when he can. Weak support was received by the hypothesis that the tendency to like the donor less when the aid cannot be repaid will be stronger, the greater the perceived cost. Support was found for the hypothesis that the decreased willingness to request future aid when the aid cannot be repaid will be stronger, the greater the perceived cost. Support was found for the hypotheses that the recipient will like the donor more and be more willing to request future aid when he has an opportunity to aid a third party than when he cannot aid anyone.