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Bargaining Strategies with Asymmetric Initiation and Termination
Author(s) -
Starbuck William H.,
Grant Dorothy F.
Publication year - 1971
Publication title -
journal of applied social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1559-1816
pISSN - 0021-9029
DOI - 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1971.tb00372.x
Subject(s) - economics , bargaining power , psychology , bargaining problem , microeconomics , social psychology
Two experimental studies of bilateral bargaining were conducted, and this paper reports findings related to differences in the conditions under which bargaining began and ended. Asymmetric initiation affected the way the subjects bargained, but not, on the average, the deals they struck. Asymmetric termination affected both bargaining behavior and deals. One surprising conclusion was that following a relatively simple configuration of bargaining strategies increased both one's probability of making a deal and one's benefits from the deal itself.