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Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process
Author(s) -
Roberts Patrick S.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2005.00148.x
Subject(s) - homeland security , per capita , incentive , salience (neuroscience) , public administration , homeland , bandwagon effect , state (computer science) , process (computing) , business , political science , economics , law , market economy , terrorism , politics , sociology , psychology , cognitive psychology , population , demography , algorithm , computer science , operating system
Small states receive more homeland security grant money per capita than large states because of the structure of representation and decision making in Congress. Beyond per capita allocations, the homeland security granting process affects the structure of state and local emergency management agencies, shifting priorities away from natural and technological disasters toward counterterrorism. I suggest using competitive grants, increasing the salience of the granting process, and changing the institutional setting in order to rationalize the granting process.