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Policy Networks, Elections, and State Subsidies 1
Author(s) -
Zahariadis Nikolaos
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2005.00124.x
Subject(s) - subsidy , competition (biology) , argument (complex analysis) , economics , state (computer science) , monopoly , politics , scope (computer science) , international economics , economic policy , international trade , market economy , public economics , economic system , political science , ecology , biochemistry , chemistry , algorithm , computer science , law , biology , programming language
What are the effects of electoral competition on the disbursement of state subsidies in industrialized democracies? I argue that the scope of subsidies, which ranges from economy‐wide to regional and industry‐specific subsidies, is determined by the extent of political (electoral) monopoly conditioned by economic threats from foreign competition. The mechanism through which electoral competition is linked to subsidies is the policy network. I assess this argument by examining thirteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the period 1990–1993. The findings offer amendments to models of policy networks and speak to the importance of domestic institutions on factor mobility and trade policy.