Premium
Presidential Influence Versus Agency Characteristics in Explaining Policy Implementation
Author(s) -
Shull Steven A.,
Garland David
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1995.tb00621.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , bureaucracy , discretion , realm , variance (accounting) , agency (philosophy) , predictability , political science , principal–agent problem , public economics , public administration , economics , econometrics , politics , corporate governance , sociology , statistics , law , accounting , mathematics , social science , finance
We posit three rival models of policy implementation in the realm of civil rights: presidential influence, bureaucratic discretion, and prior activities. The first model, presidential influence, works better than the bureaucratic discretion or prior activities models. In fact, as modified in the analysis, presidential influence explains half of the adjusted variance in civil rights cases filed but just under a quarter of adjusted variance in cases closed. A combined model using the most powerful variables from each of the three models improved predictability only slightly and only for cases filed. The findings were encouraging, particularly when one considers the major problems that occur when analyzing data at the agency level.