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Privacy as Autonomy vs. Privacy as Familial Attachment: A Conceptual Approach to Right to Privacy Cases
Author(s) -
Boling Patricia
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1994.tb00581.x
Subject(s) - right to privacy , autonomy , supreme court , abortion , the right to privacy , jurisprudence , law , constitutional right , sociology , reproductive rights , political science , human rights , pregnancy , biology , genetics
This article explains why the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence has become deeply problematic for addressing emerging reproductive and sexual choice issues, focusing on abortion funding, minors seeking abortions, adults engaging in consenting homosexual sex, and pregnant women accused of abusing their fetuses. The article makes two arguments. First, it contends that what is private about the rights asserted in cases like Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade has never been fully articulated nor defended, leaving these central decisions conceptually unpersuasive. Second, the article shows that “privacy” is used in two very different senses in Supreme Court constitutional right‐to‐privacy decisions: one rooted in respect for marriage and the family, the other in notions of personal autonomy. Although both senses deserve to be protected, the court has tended to prefer the familial sense of privacy to the autonomy one, with serious consequences for privacy concerns that are not connected to family relationships or that are perceived as undercutting “family values.”