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Institutional Capacity And The Resolution Of A Commons Dilemma
Author(s) -
Blomquist William,
Ostrom Elinor
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1985.tb00364.x
Subject(s) - dilemma , commons , relevance (law) , resolution (logic) , forcing (mathematics) , social dilemma , law and economics , political science , sociology , economics , computer science , microeconomics , epistemology , law , artificial intelligence , mathematics , philosophy , mathematical analysis
This article concerns the dynamic process of resolving a commons dilemma without an externally imposed solution. We focus on two approaches: a model by Lewis and Cowens (1983) that yields a cooperative private arranghent that incorporates voluntarily chosen public institutions as instruments facilitating a resolution of the commons dilemma. The conditions necessary to Lewis and Cowen's result–a Itresolution without institutions–are contrasted with Ilinstitutional capacity” conditions treated as variables that may take on values enhancing the possibility of resolution. This latter approach yields certain advantages: less extreme assumptions, greater descriptive relevance, and the possibility of a variety of actual resolutions. A description of the case of West Basin in Southern California offers an example of the interaction of institutional capacity with participants' actions to produce a successful resolution of a commons dilemma.