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Institutional Impediments To Efficient Water Allocation
Author(s) -
Gardner B. Delworth
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1985.tb00362.x
Subject(s) - appropriation , water resources , water scarcity , business , riparian zone , natural resource economics , scarcity , water trading , arid , integrated water resources management , water conservation , water right , environmental economics , environmental resource management , environmental planning , economics , environmental science , market economy , ecology , philosophy , linguistics , habitat , biology
Current water institutions were developed for conditions of water penty rather than scarcity and are unable to allocate water resources efficiently under conditions such as those in the arid West. This paper reviews riparian, appropriation and correlative water law as well as existing admin‐ istrative rules governing water use in California and finds that all of these institutions violate norms of economic efficiency. The review suggests that decentralized water systems such as mutual irrigation companies with their appropriate laws are more flexible than centralized federal or state systems in promoting water movement to higher valued use. The paper concludes that institutional mechanisms which promote rather than inhibit water trades and transfers are more appropriate to arid areas and that these institutions will become increasingly popular as water becomes increasingly scarce.