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POLITICIANS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES
Author(s) -
Llneberry Robert L.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1985.tb00240.x
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , distribution (mathematics) , universalism , league , public policy , political science , public economics , public administration , economics , politics , law , mathematical analysis , physics , mathematics , astronomy
Policy scientists can make important contributions to the study of policy distribution, a question that is likely to be among the most crucial national issues to be discussed throughout this decade. One aspect of this question that has been neglected is the theoretical assumption associated with public choice theory that politicians, once elected, will reward their supporters through the distribution of policy benefits. However, empirical research indicates that policy benefits seldom are distributed in this way. Instead, politicians follow the principle of universalism. In league with bureaucracies and policy communities, politicians define need and then ask bureaucracies to allocate benefits. This makes politicians roles as distributors of policy very different than simplistic models suggest.