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THEORIES OF REGULATORY IMPACT: THE ROLES OF THE REGULATOR, THE REGULATED, AND THE PUBLIC
Author(s) -
Berry William D.
Publication year - 1982
Publication title -
review of policy research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.832
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1541-1338
pISSN - 1541-132X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00447.x
Subject(s) - salient , legislature , incentive , commission , political science , public economics , positive economics , law and economics , regulator , politics , regulatory reform , public administration , economics , law , microeconomics , biochemistry , gene , chemistry
Berry reviews the major theories for why legislative intent differs from regulatory output including: (1) theories of commission inadequacy, (2) group theories of political science, and (3) group theories of regulation offered by economists. He reviews the salient literature in each type and concludes that none alone incorporates a sufficient explanation for the wide range of regulatory outcomes. Such an explanation, he maintains, requires an analysis of all three actors, and of the variation in the incentives, resources, and goals of each.