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Controlling Democracy: The Principal–Agent Problems in Election Administration
Author(s) -
Alvarez R. Michael,
Hall Thad E.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2006.00188.x
Subject(s) - voting , democracy , agency (philosophy) , principal (computer security) , polling , principal–agent problem , political science , group voting ticket , public administration , spoilt vote , administration (probate law) , local election , split ticket voting , adverse selection , first past the post voting , business , computer science , actuarial science , computer security , politics , sociology , finance , law , social science , corporate governance , operating system
Election reform has become a major issue since the 2000 election, but little consideration has been given to the issues associated with managing them. In this article, we use principal–agent theory to examine the problems associated with Election Day polling place voting. We note that Election Day voting manifests problems that agency theory shows are difficult to overcome, including adverse selection of and shirking by poll workers. We then examine alternate methods of voting, such as early, absentee, and Internet voting, and show how these reforms can mitigate many of the more severe principal–agent problems in election management.