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The Competition Criterion in British Merger Control Policy
Author(s) -
Kryda Georgine M.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2002.tb02145.x
Subject(s) - merger control , negotiation , competition (biology) , competition policy , control (management) , government (linguistics) , doctrine , business , public administration , political science , economics , law and economics , management , law , international trade , finance , commission , european union , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , biology
The 1984 Tebbit Doctrine formalized competition as the watchword in British merger control, a highly discretionary system that encourages negotiation between firms and the government. The government has rarely invoked the full extent of its review powers over corporate mergers, even after the 1989 European Merger Control Regulation ceded some authority to Brussels. Is competition really a criterion influencing British merger control, or do institutional and personal biases direct the decision? This article reviews the rationale for merger control, outlines the structure of the British system, and analyzes merger activity and regulators' decisions from 1984–2000.