A Web of Interests: Stalemate on the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States has adopted a policy of geological disposal to resolve the problem of permanent disposition of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel (SNF), but has been unable to implement this policy. This study draws upon literature on policymaking and interest group representation to examine that inability. It develops and explores a conceptualization of policy stalemate to analyze the case. The study finds that the United States has arrived at a stalemate over SNF disposal policy in part because of its pluralist system of interest group representation, and in part because of the nature of the problem. The case demonstrates how, in a pluralist system, the interaction of interests over a complex and difficult policy problem can result in stalemate. Few of the involved interest groups have sufficient incentives to either implement current SNF disposal policy or to revisit the policy. Barring significant change in the nature of the problem, the balance of interests, or other factors in the policy environment, the stalemate will continue. The central question of this symposium is how institutionalized systems of interest group representation manage competing demands for environmental protection with demands for energy. In the case of SNF disposal, the United States in effect is managing these competing demands by not addressing them. SNF disposal policy does not appear to pose directly the expected tradeoff between demands for environmental protection and accessible energy, as the conflict tends to be defined primarily in environmental terms. However, the trade‐off is implicit; failure to resolve the problem will eventually impact continued access to nuclear energy.