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Economic Resources and Political Power at the Local Level in Post‐Soviet Russia
Author(s) -
Evans Alfred B.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2000.tb02018.x
Subject(s) - communism , politics , independence (probability theory) , local government , political economy , political science , legislation , legislature , constitution , democracy , divestment , central government , power (physics) , economic system , economic policy , economics , public administration , law , statistics , physics , mathematics , quantum mechanics
In the 1990s in local government in Russia, the dominant trends might be described as neo‐Soviet because of their apparent continuity with patterns that prevailed before the end of communist rule in that country. The promise of independence for “local self‐government,” as set forth in the Russian Constitution of 1993 and subsequent legislation, largely has been frustrated. The tendency of privatized economic enterprises to divest themselves of responsibility for social benefits, and the lack of an adequate base for financial independence for local governments, have made it necessary for local officials to rely heavily on the regional authorities for support. Within local government, the elected legislature usually is subordinate to a dominant executive leadership. Those features of contemporary local government in Russia are explained by the consequences of decisions adopted by the country's post‐Communist leadership, including the method and content of economic reform. The results are unfavorable both for the resurgence of the local economy and the growth of democracy at the local level.