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American and Canadian Environmental Federalism; A Game‐Theoretic Analysis
Author(s) -
Gillroy John Martin
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1999.tb01973.x
Subject(s) - federalism , cooperative federalism , constitution , dilemma , political science , prisoner's dilemma , dual federalism , environmental policy , law and economics , public administration , game theory , economics , law , politics , environmental resource management , mathematical economics , epistemology , philosophy
To understand why environmental federalism is different in Canada and the United States, one might begin with the initial strategic realities that faced the Fathers of Canadian Confederation and the Framers of the Constitution of the United States. This essay examines federalism from a game‐theoretic point of view, to integrate and expose the rational properties of the decision to federate and the logical entailments of that choice for environmental policy within two specific strategic contexts. Specifically, I suggest that American environmental federalism has arisen in response to the strategic reality of a Prisoner's Dilemma, while Canadian environmental federalism can be analyzed as an effort to regulate confrontations within a game of Chicken. In addition to the analysis of each federated structure, evidence from five case studies demonstrates the usefulness of games to the study of comparative federalism