Premium
The Army and Chemical Weapons Destruction: Implementation in a Changing Context
Author(s) -
Lambright W. Henry,
Gereben Agnes,
Cerveny Lee
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1998.tb01941.x
Subject(s) - stockpile , chemical warfare , politics , cold war , context (archaeology) , political science , face (sociological concept) , process (computing) , operations research , public administration , engineering , law , computer science , sociology , history , social science , archaeology , operating system
In 1985, Congress directed the Army to destroy the nation's stockpile of chemical weapons. The estimate was that this task could be accomplished by 1994 at a cost of $1.7 billion. By 1998, only a portion of the stockpile has been destroyed, the deadline extended to 2007 and the estimated cost had risen to approximately $16 billion. This paper discusses the factors underlying cost escalation and missed deadlines. It examines the diffusion of control over the implementation process surrounding the chemical weapons demilitarization (Chem Demil) program in the United States. Focusing on the role of the Army and its difficulties in adjusting strategies in the face of political change from the Cold War to the post‐Cold War setting, it analyzes the course of implementation through three converging “streams of political activity.” What differentiates the federal, intergovernmental, and international stream are the nature an number of actors, and the type of pressures with which the Army must deal.