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Between Autonomy and Capture
Author(s) -
EcheverriGent John
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1992.tb00163.x
Subject(s) - autonomy , normative , agency (philosophy) , politics , government (linguistics) , conceptual framework , political science , economic system , social exchange theory , sociology , public relations , public administration , business , economics , social science , linguistics , philosophy , law
This article uses organization theory and political economy to develop a conceptual framework, for analyzing factors that shape relations between government agencies and their social environment. The framework conceptualizes these relations as social networks composed of actors engaged in the exchange of resources. Then, it develops an understanding of how cultural norms shape these exchanges. The article concludes by examining the framework's normative implications. In particular, it explores when agency autonomy promotes effective policy implementation and when it results in unaccountability. It also demonstrates that, in many cases, an agency's dependence on actors in its environment may enhance the effectiveness of policy implementation.