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THE ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
Author(s) -
Colby Peter W.
Publication year - 1983
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1983.tb00572.x
Subject(s) - incentive , politics , collective action , public relations , public interest , product (mathematics) , interest group , public good , public administration , action (physics) , business , political science , public economics , law and economics , economics , microeconomics , law , physics , geometry , mathematics , quantum mechanics
The topic here is whether broad public interests in consumer rights, a clean environment, and political reform have the organizational strength to be represented effectively when policy‐making is the responsibility of bureaus and administrative agencies. The most persuasive explanation of why such interests could not be effective on a sustained basis is the collective action theory of Mancur Olson. The paper supports research arguing for modifications of Olson's theory by showing how public interests have been at least partially successful in maintaining effectiveness over time based on four concepts: the similarity of public interest groups to social movements, the use of purposive and solidary incentives, the use of material incentives to support lobbying as a by‐product of other activities, and the role of organizational entrepreneurs supported by new technology, notably the computerized mailing list.