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Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets
Author(s) -
Hoy Michael,
Ruse Michael
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
risk management and insurance review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.386
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1540-6296
pISSN - 1098-1616
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6296.2005.00057.x
Subject(s) - underwriting , lawmaking , genetic discrimination , work (physics) , economics , perspective (graphical) , insurance policy , order (exchange) , public economics , genetic testing , business , actuarial science , political science , finance , law , legislature , engineering , medicine , mechanical engineering , artificial intelligence , computer science
The debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to use results of genetic tests for underwriting purposes is both lively and increasingly relevant as both technology and lawmaking efforts are progressing rapidly. In this article we outline the primary economic and non‐economic arguments made in favor of and against allowing insurers to risk‐rate premiums on the basis of genetic test results. While economic analysis has much to offer in enlightening this debate and informing policy makers, we argue that such work must be cast within the overall perspective of the genetic testing debate. Moreover, despite substantial strides by economists in understanding the role of information in the way insurance markets operate, much work still needs to be done in order for economic analysis to be confidently applied to the looming social issues of the continuing genetic revolution.