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Board Independence and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover
Author(s) -
Fu Richard,
Wedge Lei
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
financial review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.621
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1540-6288
pISSN - 0732-8516
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2011.00314.x
Subject(s) - mutual fund , independence (probability theory) , business , accounting , corporate governance , commission , fund administration , closed end fund , finance , fund of funds , statistics , mathematics , market liquidity
This paper studies the relationship between board independence and manager turnover in the mutual fund industry. Using the Lipper 2003 mutual fund board data, we find that manager turnover is more likely to happen to funds with poor prior performance and more independent boards. Consistent with previous studies such as Tufano and Sevick (1997), our research provides new evidence in support of the Securities and Exchange Commission's approach of improving fund governance by promoting board independence.