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The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions
Author(s) -
Boulton Thomas J.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
financial review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.621
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1540-6288
pISSN - 0732-8516
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2011.00297.x
Subject(s) - initial public offering , underwriting , business , equity (law) , market for corporate control , venture capital , control (management) , order (exchange) , finance , monetary economics , economics , corporate governance , shareholder , management , political science , law
Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.